American Treasure

This wants to say that the insured can expose the biggest risks, increased the probability of payment on the part of the insuring one. The same problem of faced moral risk for the market of insurances he is observvel in other situations of the economy, that is, it always will disclose itself when a contract having been signed, the parts do not possess conditions to follow the behavior or the actions taken for the other part. As Kreps (1994) the problem of moral risk occurs when a part of a transaction can take certain actions that (i) affect the result gotten for the second part, but that (II) the second part cannot monitor or control perfectly. The example presented for Kreps is of fire insurance, where the insured can or not be worried adequately about the risk of a fire. The solution would be the presence of incentives, that is, to structuralize transactions where the part that takes the actions, in its proper interest, will act as what the second part would prefer. As Mishkin (2000) the cost of monitorao of the behavior of the agents is very raised, what in last instance it could make impracticable the transaction. Another form of moral risk is when the agent withholds privileged information in relation to the main one. We find, also, in this in case that, diverse examples in the economy. We can cite the financial market, in the case where the presence of a lender of last instance or insurances of deposits for commercial banks can occur problems of moral risk, as much on the part of the depositors whom they will not look to select financial the institutions more solid, how much for the financial institutions that will expand its credits without concern how much to the risks taken in the operations. Perfectly applicable situation to the situation that if created after the bankruptcy of the Lehmann Brothers, where the American Treasure was obliged to save some financial institutions reached by subprime.